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Many scholars view transformational grammar as an attempt 
to represent the structure of linguistic knowledge in the mind and 
seek to apply transformational descriptions of languages to the de- 
velopment of second language teaching materials. It will be claimed 
in this paper that it is a mistake to look to transformational gram- 
mar or any other theory of linguistic description to provide the 
theoretical basis for either second language pedagogy o r  a theory 
of language acquisition. One may well wish to describe the ab- 
stract  or logical structure of a language by constructing a trans- 
formational grammar which generates the set of sentences identi- 
fied with that language. However, this attempt should not be con- 
fused with an attempt to understand the cognitive structures and 
processes involved in knowing or  using a language. It is a cogni- 
tive theory of language within the field of psycholinguistics rather 
than a theory of linguistic description which should underlie lan- 
guage teaching materials. 
A great deal of effort has been expended in the attempt to 
demonstrate the potential contributions of the field of descriptive 
linguistics to the teaching of second languages and, since the theory 
of transformational grammar has become the dominant theory in 
the field of linguistics, it is not surprising that applied linguists 
have sought to apply transformational grammar to gain new in- 
sights into the teaching of second languages. It will be claimed 
in this paper that it is a mistake to look to transformational 
grammar or  any other theory of linguistic description to provide 
the theoretical basis for either second language pedagogy or  a 
theory of language acquisition. That is, what is needed in the 
field of language teaching are not applied linguists but rather ap- 
Plied psychologists. 
The primary goal of the language teacher is to instill in the 
student abilities in the production and comprehension of the target 
language which are comparable to those of the native speaker. 
Before adequate methods of language pedagogy can be developed, 
textbook writers and teachers will have to have access to a theory 
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of human language acquisition and an understanding of the psycho- 
logical representation of linguistic knowledge in the mind. Any- 
thing less puts the teacher in the position of merely presenting 
data to the student in a hit and miss fashion with no principled 
basis for deciding what it is that should be taught, the order of 
presentation, or  how to give adequate explanations. Many scholars 
view transformational grammar as an attempt to represent the 
structure of linguistic knowledge in the mind and seek to apply 
transformational descriptions of languages directly to the develop- 
ment of second language teaching materials. If it is true that 
transformational grammar is a cognitive theory of language which 
is intended to make claims regarding the psychological representa- 
tion of knowledge, then applied linguists who base their teaching 
materials on transformational grammar may feel that they a r e  on 
the right track. If, however, transformational grammar makes no 
psychological claims, then just what is its status and what does it 
have to say  to the language teacher? 
When we consider people’s ability to acquire, store, and use 
language and ask what kind of theory would ccexplain” or  “char- 
acterize” human linguistic competence, we realize that there are 
at least three approaches open to us. These three approaches 
correspond to three “levels” of theories which may be constructed 
to describe human behavior. First, we may be concerned with a 
neurophysiological, biochemical description of the actual physical 
processes involved in language. Meaningful statements on this 
level are certainly far off in the future and it is not obvious that 
neurophysiology will contribute anything to the language teacher. 
Secondly, our goals may be in the field of descriptive linguistics 
and lead us to formal descriptions of languages and a theory of 
linguistic description. Thirdly, we may be concerned with develop- 
ing a cognitive theory of language within the field of psycholinguis- 
tics. It is only the latter type of theory which could be utilized 
in the development of a theory of language acquisition. This is 
true because theories of linguistic description are concerned with 
the abstract or logical structure of languages and consider a lan- 
guage as an autonomous system isolated from the psychological 
processes which result in the acquisition, storage, and use of lin- 
guistic knowledge. Theories of linguistic description claim nothing 
regarding the way in which the knowledge of language processes 
and data is structured and stored in the mind (what might be called 
a theory of linguistic competence) or how a person acquires and 
utilizes these cognitive structures in producing or understanding 
sentences (that is, linguistic performance). Both theories of com- 
petence and theories of performance as defined here a re  beyond 
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the goals of descriptive linguistics if we restrict these goals to 
the description of the abstract structure of linguistic utterances. 
No attempt is made to integrate theories of linguistic description 
with the concerns of psychologists interested in constructing models 
of other cognitive processes such as problem solving, perception, 
long and short-term memory, concepts and concept formation. Of 
course, descriptive linguistics has validity as a field of scientific 
endeavor but it should not be confused with the atteqpt to under- 
stand human language as a psychological phenomenon. The view- 
point of a cognitive theory of language must be psychological, that 
is, it should be concerned with describing people rather than de- 
scribing languages. In addition, there must be at least some indi- 
cation of how such a theory might be integrated with other cogni- 
tive functions and the models which have been proposed to explain 
them. 
Recently, attempts have been made to formalize linguistic de- 
scriptions and to develop theoretical frameworks within which Ian- 
guages could be described. Unfortunately, at the present time there 
exists confusion in the field regarding the status of theories which 
have been proposed. In particular, the theory of transformational 
grammar proposed primarily by Chomsky and deriving in part from 
the work of Harris, although in origin a descriptive theory having 
nothing to do with human cognitive processes, is seen by some as 
having great relevance to a cognitive theory of human language. 
This confusion could perhaps be lessened if we made a firm 
distinction between the goals, implications, and status of the theory 
itself and statements which transformationalists have made concern- 
ing their theory of description as well as their conjectures regard- 
ing the structure of language in the mind. Consider the following 
quotations from Chomsky: 
“The person who has learned a language has internalized a sys- 
tem of rules that relate sound and meaning in a particular way. . . 
The linguist, constructing a grammar of a language, is, in effect, 
proposing a hypothesis concerning this internalized system” (1968: 
23) 
(ii) “The problem for the linguist, as well as for the child learning 
the language, is to determine from the data of performance the 
underlying system of rules that has been mastered by the speaker- 
er-hearer and that he puts to use in actual performance. Hence, 
in the technical sense, linguistic theory is mentalistic, since it is 
concerned with discovering a mental reality underlying actual be- 
havior.” (1965:4) 
(i) 
We may agree with Chomsky when he says that people who 
have learned a language possess something that may be called a 
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system of rules, but we must disagree with him if he means to 
imply that the linguist’s grammar is necessarily a hypothesis con- 
cerning the structure of this system of rules. If the grammar that 
Chomsky refers to is a transformational grammar, then it is not 
at all clear that one could consider a grammar a theory of how 
knowledge of a language system is structured in the mind. If a 
transformational grammar is intended to be a cognitive theory, not 
only may it  be rejected out of hand as totally inadequate, but it 
will be argued that, in principle, no refinement of the theory could 
make it an adequate theory of the kind needed. 
Chomsky would not claim (although some have) that the rules 
of a transformational grammar are intended to be isomorphic with 
the cognitive system of ‘rules’ that people possess after having 
learned a language. The rules and categories of a transformational 
grammar are part of an attempt to describe the set of sentences 
which constitute a ‘‘language.” We may feel that by providing 
structural descriptions of sentences we have ‘characterized’ the 
cognitive structures stored by the speaker-hearer, but this use of 
the term “characterize” should not lead us to believe that we have 
therefore discovered or even attempted to discover the mental 
reality which underlies linguistic behavior. 
Structural linguists have also attempted to describe the gram- 
matical structure of languages, giving the constituent structure of 
the sentence patterns in the language. Neither they themselves nor 
anyone else was ever tempted to consider their grammars to be 
hypotheses concerning the speaker-hearer’s internal linguistic 
knowledge. A transformational grammar may provide a better de- 
scription in that it attempts to be explicit and considers a wider 
range of language data, but both types of grammars attempt to de- 
scribe language structure. We cannot say that a transformational 
grammar makes cognitive claims while a structuralist grammar 
does not. 
One might feel that because it has a level of “deep structure” 
which structuralist formulations lacked, transformational grammar 
alone may be considered a hypothesis concerning the knowledge 
structure of a speaker-hearer, but in a transformational grammar, 
the level of deep structure is an artifact of the system of rewrite 
rules and should by no means be equated with an attempt to de- 
scribe the cognitive structures which underlie sentences in language 
use. Some psycholinguists (e.g., McNeill 1966), after concluding 
that people must have knowledge of language structure stored and 
some mechanism for mapping one kind of structure into another, 
wish to equate the cognitive structures with deep structure syntac- 
tic phrase markers and the mapping operation with the transforma- 
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tional rules found in a descriptive grammar. Notice, however, that 
transformations as defined by Chomsky are  not processes (psycho- 
logical or otherwise) but are  merely statements of the well-formed- 
ness conditions which hold between two tree structures. Phrase 
structure rules “generate” trees only in the sense that they de- 
fine the structure of trees. They do not imply a cognitive system 
of phrase structure rules which “produce” trees. There is no 
empirical evidence that human beings possess deep syntactic phrase 
markers as part of their linguistic knowledge or that people go 
through a process of categorial decomposition of the S -NP + V P  
variety. All that can be stated is that in Chomsky’s theory of lin- 
guistic description there is a level of deep structure trees, defined 
by phrase structure rules, which map onto surface structure trees. 
A further reason for rejecting the direct transfer of Chomsky’s 
theory of linguistic description to discussions of cognitive structures 
is that the tree structures in Chomsky’s theory are  inherently in- 
capable of formally representing the structure of linguistic knowl- 
edge in the mind. A base categorial component such as Chomsky’s 
is perhaps powerful enough to generate symbols in a correct order 
with the correct constituent structure, and it is therefore not a 
priori impossible that it could serve as the basis for a sentence 
generator in a theory of linguistic description. If, however, our 
concern is with a cognitive theory of language, then it is demon- 
strably inadequate. Trees are  only one form of graph structure 
and not particularly powerful when compared to other more com- 
plex graphs used to model psychological processes. 
Since most of our technical vocabulary is used both in the de- 
scriptive theory where it receives formal definition and in our 
conjectures regarding cognitive structures, it is not surprising that 
many people are  willing to believe that the framework of trans- 
formational grammar is suitably extended to a concern for a cogni- 
tive theory of language. The term “generative grammar” is used 
to mean both the formal device constructed by a linguist and the 
hypothetical cognitive system which enables people to engage in 
linguistic behavior. A linguist writes “rules” and people are said 
to have “internalized” a system of c‘rules.’s 
A further example of the desire to give cognitive status to the 
theory of transformational grammar is seen in the following quota- 
tion from Chomsky. (1968), pp. 4-5: 
“Knowledge of a language involves the ability to assign deep and 
surface structures to an infinite range of sentences, to relate these 
structures appropriately, and to assign a phonetic interpretation to 
the surface structure and to construct a semantic interpretation on 
the basis of the grammatical relations of the deep structure.” 
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One isn’t too surprised to discover that these abilities correspond 
to the operations and components of a transformational grammar. 
If we accepted this list of abilities as in fact what is involved in 
possessing “knowledge of a language,” we might be tempted to 
consider transformational grammar as a proposal for a theory of 
human language. However, when we look for the cognitive and be- 
havioral counterparts to these four abilities, it is not clear what 
could be intended, especially when we bear in mind that these abil- 
ities are meant to reflect the structure of stored knowledge or 
“competence .” 
It has been primarily due to discussions of the compentence- 
performance distinction and statements to the effect that a trans- 
formational grammar ‘‘characterizes the knowledge of the ideal 
speaker-hearer” that some linguists and psycholinguists are willing 
to believe that a transformational grammar is concerned with de- 
scribing the cognitive structures which give rise to human language. 
The distinction between a theory of competence (i.e., a grammar) 
and a theory of performance has served to give transformational 
grammar an aura of cognitive significance while allowing it to ig- 
nore all questions of cognitive structure and processes. 
At issue here a re  general assumptions concerning the condi- 
tions under which a formal model may be assumed to provide a 
description of unobservable systems of cognitive structures. Identity 
in terms of empirical consequences is not sufficient to insure that 
a model is in fact a description of the operations and structures of 
an unobservable cognitive system. The output of an electronic cal- 
culator may be empirically indistinguishable from the output of an 
ideal human adder-subtractor (e .g., 4,564 given the instruction to 
find the produce of 326 14), yet few would wish to claim that a 
circuit diagram for a calculator is necessarily a description of the 
way in which knowledge of arithmetic operations is represented in 
the mind. 
Consider the schema presented in f@re 1 which represents 
the components and input- output relations of a transformational 
grammar as formulated by Chomsky. If a transformational gram- 
mar for a language existed, it would assign deep and surface struc- 
tures to an infinite range of sentences in the sense that the base 
component would generate deep structure phrase markers and the 
transformational component would map these onto surface struc- 
tures. Structures generated by the grammar would be related ap- 
propriately if empirical evidence in the form of native speaker 
judgments of relatedness was reflected by phrase markers shar- 
ing appropriate elements of structure. How the phonological com- 
ponent of a transformational grammar could assign a phonetic 
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representation given an input of surface structure phrase markers 
with lexical items and grammatical formatives as terminal nodes, 
has been outlined in Chomsky and Halle (1968). The operation and 
content of the semantic interpretation component is almost com- 
ple t ely unspecified. 
Taken literally as a hypothesis concerning the internal repre- 
sentation of linguistic knowledge which people possess and use to 
produce and understand language, this schema would seem to imply 
that people first run through their categorial component and select 
a grammatical structure, insert permissible lexical items, and then 
decide what they want to say. As noted in Chomsky (1969), this is 
certainly not what goes on in language production and the organi- 
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zation of a transformational grammar is not intended to make 
claims regarding the temporal or logical order of psychological 
processes relevant to language performance. It is meaningless to 
talk of an intrinsic order of a mapping operation such as the map- 
ping between deep and surface structures. Also, in a theory of 
linguistic description such as transformational grammar, it makes 
no sense to posit a necessary order for the selection of structures. 
Chomsky‘s grammar generates quadruples (a deep structure, a sur- 
face structure, a phonetic representation, and a semantic repre- 
sentation). It cannot be said that one type of structure must be 
selected before or after another. 
The result of the lack of implicit order of operations, however, 
is the conclusion that the schema of figure 1 can make no cognitive 
claims on the gross level of componential structure. In any hy- 
pothesis concerning the structure of knowledge in the mind, both 
the chronological and logical order of psychological processes must 
be implicit if it is this knowledge which is relevant to language 
production and comprehension. Moreover, it is probably an over- 
simplification to assume that a transformational grammar can be 
made relevant to a theory of performance merely by superimposing 
a preferred order of operations. There is evidence that language 
production and comprehension cannot simply be a matter of apply- 
ing the unique grammar developed in a ‘theory of competence’: 
e.g., this would imply that it is easier to generate new sentences 
than to understand new sentences but it is generally recognized that 
people (and children in particular) understand many more sentences 
than they can produce; also, the fact that people understand many 
different dialects shows that more than the sentence production 
grammar must be available in comprehension. (These observa- 
tions are  from Quillian 1966) 
It is probably true that we must first have a theory of how 
people’s knowledge of language is structured and stored in the mind 
before we can develop a theory of how this knowledge is used, but 
a transformational grammar is not the description of this knowledge 
that we require. 
One could perhaps counter this assertion with the claim that 
the constituent structures posited in a linguistic description do 
correspond to functioning psychological units. People have strong 
intuitions regarding the units of sentence structure and it seems 
possible to corroborate experimentally the claims which a grammar 
makes in this regard. (See, for example, Fodor & Bever 1965) 
When linguists describe languages they do attempt to accommodate 
the judgments of native speakers concerning the constituent parts 
of sentences. 
TRANSFORMATIONAL GRAMMAR 263 
The techniques of Immediate Constituent Analysis developed in 
structural linguistics were part of an attempt to describe the con- 
stituent structure of sentences. (See, for example, Wells  1947) 
Transformational grammar has attempted to overcome the diffi- 
culties inherent in any attempt to describe language structure by 
merely slicing up sentences. IC analysis was not equipped to deal 
with such things as discontinuous constituents, some types of struc- 
tural ambiguity, and people’s intuitions regarding the relationships 
between sentences. A transformational grammar can provide an 
account of how discontinuous elements in a sentence belong to the 
same constituent; it can disambiguate identical surface structures; 
and it does implicitly express relationships between sentences. 
However, the relevant question is whether the apparatus employed 
in a transformational grammar to accomplish these descriptive 
goals bears any relationship to psychological processes which func- 
tion in human language. 
Consider the following sentences which are examples of one 
type of “structural ambiguity”: 
(lla) 
(l lb) 
John is easy to please. 
John is eager to please. 
In a transformational grammar they might be assigned superficial 
phrase markers of the following sort: 
(1la)I and (llb)’ 
Tense 
John pres be to please 
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Note that while the surface structures (lla)' and (llb)' have 
exactly the same constituent structure and the same labels onnodes, 
they a re  in fact understood by people to be very different in the 
relationships between their parts. John is, in some sense, the 
object of please in (lla) but the subject of please in (llb). The 
sentences differ systematically in their relationships to other sen- 






On the basis of such evidence, a transformational grammar would 
claim that the two sentences, although possessing identical surface 
structures, differ in that they must be derived from different under- 
lying syntactic structures (i.e., different K-initial Phrase Markers). 
Following these cri teria we may conclude that the following 
pair of sentences also exhibit the same type of structural ambiguity. 
(16a) John shot Mary. 
(16b) John hated Mary. 
It is easy for Mary to please John. 
*It is eager for Mary to please John. 
John is eager to please Mary. 
*John is easy to please Mary. 
Once again two sentences have the same constituent structure and 
the same labelling. They differ in the relations between their parts 
and in their relationships to other sentences in a way that is paral- 





John shot Mary with a gun. 
*John hated Mary with a gun. 
John had hatred for Mary. 
*John had shooting for Mary. 
It seems not to be the case, however, that (16a) and (16b) would 
be derived from different underlying syntactic structures in atrans- 
formational grammar of the type proposed by Chomsky except inso- 
far as the lexical entries for the verbs shoot and hate would differ. 
Moreover, transformational grammar provides no formal way to 
distinguish the cases such as (lla) and (l lb) where different deep 
structures a re  posited and cases such as (16a) and (16b), where we 
would feel uneasy in doing so. 
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Empirical data which can be gathered concerning such sen- 
tences as (1la)-(llb) and (16a)-(16b) show that the pairs of sen- 
tences a r e  understood differently and that they would have different 
semantic representations. There is, however, no evidence that it 
would be necessary o r  desirable to posit different syntactic struc- 
tures from which they must be derived or  that people go through a 
process of categorial decomposition of the S -NP  + VP type, re- 
sulting in different deep syntactic structures for, e.g., ( l la)  and (llb). 
Constituents which have been determined to exist at the level 
of occurring sentences together with the words which label them, 
are generally taken to define syntactic categories. Within transfor- 
mational grammar, syntactic categories such as S and N P  receive 
formal definition by virtue of their position in an ordered set of 
rewrite rules which define the supercategories and subcategories 
of a particular category. What is not obvious is that these cate- 
gories should be considered to function cognitively in a way analo- 
gous to their role in the phrase structure rules of the base com- 
ponent of a transformational grammar. Deep syntactic categories 
are not typically posited after careful investigation into the cate- 
gories which people might actually possess, but amount to those 
categories which seem to be necessary if our goal is to construct 
a device which will strongly generate the set of sentences which, 
for Chomsky, constitutes the language. Instead of employing the 
symbols S and NP, one might as well use $ and 9 as category 
labels in a transformational grammar. However, using the words 
“sentence” and “noun phrase” carry over into the notation cer- 
tain connotations of significance that $ and $ lack. 
Transformational theory is an extension and a formalization of 
the concerns of structural linguists. The goals of the theory of 
transformational grammar should be taken to be those originally 
expressed by Chomsky: 
“The fundamental aim in the linguistic analysis of a language L is 
to separate the gmmmatical sequences which are the sentences of 
L from the ungvammatical sequences which are not sentences of L 
and to study the structure of the grammaticalsequences. The gram- 
mar of L wil l  thus be a device that generates all the grammatical 
sequences of L and none of the ungrammatical ones.” (1957:13) 
More recent discussions imputing cognitive status to the theory 
should be taken as a verbal overlay which has not been matched 
by any substantive change in either the goals or  the status of the 
theory itself. 
Only a short time after transformational grammar became gen- 
erally accepted as the reigning theory in the field of linguistics, 
and in addition, was voted the theory most likely to succeed in 
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providing an account of language which could be utilized in other 
scientific disciplines such as psychology, machine translation, and 
high school English teaching, dissention and heresy drove a firm 
wedge into the once solid ranks of transformationalists. There are  
now at least two different theories of transformational grammar: 
the standard theory of the cclexicalists,y~ represented by Chomsky, 
Jackendoff, etc. and the revisionist theory of the “transformation- 
alists” (henceforth “neo-transformationalists”), represented by 
McCawley, Lakoff, Ross, etc. 
The neo-transformationalists have rejected Chomsky’s standard 
theory as inadequate to represent the facts of language. Chomsky, 
on the other hand, has dismissed the proposals of the neo-trans- 
formationalists as inferior ‘cnotational variants” of his theory. 
The schism among transformationalist grammarians has had its 
origin in attempts to describe language structure within the frame- 
work of Chomsky’s theory. For some linguists, it seemed necessary 
to posit increasingly more abstract deep structures than those 
which had been proposed in Chomsky (1965). This increased de- 
gree of abstractness appeared necessary if the grammar were to 
generate all acceptable surface structures, block unacceptable sur- 
face structures, and account for the unacceptability of certain sen- 
tences. Also, the evaluative criterion of simplicity so prominent 
in earlier transformational grammar gave way to a greater con- 
cern for a criterion of naturalness. Thus, there was dissatisfaction 
with categories and structures which, while adequate to generate 
correct strings, were intuitively felt not to reflect the facts of 
human language. Moreover, if substantive linguistic universals 
were to play any role in grammar, deep structures had necessarily 
to become less language specific. 
The deep structures which were deemed most natural and cor- 
rect became further and further removed from the superficial form 
of sentences. An attempt was made to justify the inclusion of ab- 
stract elements and embedded sentences on syntactic grounds. How- 
ever, the deep syntactic structures posited for sentences became 
more and more to suspiciously resemble exactly the kind of in- 
formation one would expect to find in the semantic representation 
of sentences. Also, transformational rules which operated on these 
structures came to look like semantic interpretation rules in re- 
verse. These considerations interacted with many other observations 
and problems which had resulted from attempting to work within 
transformational grammar and the result was the hypothesis that 
it was neither necessary nor desirable that a grammar should have 
both a syntactic categorial component which generates syntactic 
phrase markers and a semantic interpretation component which 
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derives semantic representations from syntactic structures. What 
was proposed was a single component which would directly generate 
semantic representations expressing meaning and containing suffi- 
cient information for the operation of transformations. It is in 
this sense that the term “generative semantics” has been used and 
it is in this sense that the theory of the neo-transformationalists 
is semantically based. 
In place of the organization of the standard theory of trans- 
formational grammar represented in figure 1 ,  the statements of 
the neo-transformationalists can be taken to imply a grammar hav- 
ing the componential structure given in figure 2. 
Even if it were true that the theory proposed by the neo-trans- 
formationalists is a mere notational variant of Chomsky’s standard 
theory (and it is not), these linguists have in fact taken up a greater 
concern with investigating the nature of human language and de- 
emphasized the goal of mechanically generating strings with the 
correct order and the appropriate constituent structure. However, 
their goals still lie within the field of descriptive linguistics and 
it is not possible to see their theory as having direct relevance 
for a cognitive theory of language. 
Since one has the feeling that meaning is what language is all 
about, any theory of human language would hopefully consider a 
theory of meaning as being of prime importance. Given the actual 
goals (as against the expressed goals) of Chomsky’s standard theory, 
it is not surprising that the aspect of human language which has 
been given the least consideration is that of meaning and semantic 
representation. While the neo-transforrnationalists place major 
emphasis on semantic representations as underlying surface syn- 
tactic structures, their concern for  meaning has been purely from 
the point of view of descriptive linguistics. Meaning, however, is 
not a function of words and sentences as phonological or grammati- 
cal entities, but of the intention of the speaker and the ability of 
the hearer to reconstruct this intended meaning. One implication 
of this statement which has been ignored by most linguists, phil- 
osophers, and (sad to say) psychologists is that if we are to dis- 
cuss meaning and semantic representation with cognitive import, 
it must be discussed in the context of a theory which attempts to 
explain human thought processes. In the same sense in which one 
cannot describe syntax in the abstract and hope to achieve a model 
of how syntactic structures are stored in the mind, one cannot iso- 
late a “linguistic” meaning for sentences which is describable 
apart from a concern with cognitive structures and expect this lin- 
guistic meaning to reflect the actual representation of meaning in 
the mind. A theory of semantics must be part of a theory of human 
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cognition if it is to have any relevance to a cognitive theory of 
human language and, in addition, the cognitive representation of 
semantic information underlying sentences may clearly be equated 
with the little understood cognitive entities called “thoughts” or  
“ideas.” 
The fact that there are people who have knowledge of the 
world, solve problems, perceive, categorize events, remember, 
create (in short, people who think) but who have not acquired any 
language at all (see, e.g., Lenneberg 1967) is sufficient to show 
that thought (and therefore meaning) must be distinct from language 
and capable of description apart from any theory of language. The 
converse, however, is not true; that is, any cognitive theory of lan- 
guage is dependent on a general theory of human cognition. If we 
equate a concern for semantics with a concern for the cognitive 
processes which originate thought, then a theory of semantics must 
be taken to be separate from (although related to) a theory of gram- 
mar. 
The process of producing thoughts and encoding these thoughts 
into language necessarily involves the retrieval of information which 
is stored in memory. The initial goal of a cognitive theory of 
semantics, therefore, should be the development of hypotheses con- 
cerning the structure of the knowledge which people have stored 
about the world and the way in which information is retrieved from 
memory structures. That is, it is precisely long-term memory 
structures which should form a major part of the semantic com- 
ponent in a cognitive theory of language. (See, e.g., Lamendella 
1969a) The psycholinguist may well be concerned with an account 
of how, given a thought or  idea retrieved o r  produced from mem- 
ory structures, a speaker encodes this thought into language and 
utters a sentence; and how, conversely, a hearer decodes sentences 
and attempts to reconstruct the thought which was in the mind of 
the speaker. However, it is the cognitive psychologist who is con- 
cerned with developing the theory of cognitive processes and the 
representations of ideas which the psycholinguist may use. 
The descriptive linguist, of course, may work toward the de- 
velopment of a theory of linguistic description and the description 
of particular languages; including an account of semantic repre- 
sentations which is divorced from any psychological considerations. 
However, the status of the theories which linguists develop should 
be made quite clear. In spite of the claims which Chomsky has 
made about his theory seeking to give it cognitive status, neither 
the standard theory of transformational grammar nor the theory of 
generative semantics of the neo-transformationalists make hy- 
potheses concerning the structure of linguistic knowledge in the mind. 
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Chomsky and other transformational grammarians have con- 
tributed a great deal to our understanding of language and language 
pedagogy, for example, by pointing out the vacuity of behavioral 
psychology and the uses to which it has been put in language teach- 
ing. However, an examination of recent second languaee textbooks 
shows just how little of any consequence has been contributed by 
the theory of transformational grammar itself to the development 
of teaching materials. Once we get beyond the superficial mis- 
applications of terminology (e.g., talking about “two surface struc- 
tures being derived by transformational rule from a common deep 
structure” when it is merely meant that two sentences are related 
in meaning), we see that the formal structures and categories de- 
fined in a transformational grammar have not been put to peda- 
gogical advantage in second language teaching (Cf. Lamendella 
1969b). Moreover, theories of linguistic description are relevant 
to language teaching only to the extent that they form part of the 
data which psycholinguists may use in constructing a cognitive 
theory of language. It is this theory which may properly be utilized 
as the theoretical basis for second language pedagogy. 
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